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Abstract—Statistical characteristics of network traffic have
attracted a significant amount of research for automated network
intrusion detection, some of which looked at applications of
natural statistical laws such as Zipf’s law, Benford’s law and the
Pareto distribution. In this paper, we present the application of
Benford’s law to a new network flow metric “flow size difference”,
which have not been studied before by other researchers, to build
an unsupervised flow-based intrusion detection system (IDS). The
method was inspired by our observation on a large number of
TCP flow datasets where normal flows tend to follow Benford’s
law closely but malicious flows tend to deviate significantly
from it. The proposed IDS is unsupervised, so it can be easily
deployed without any training. It has two simple operational
parameters with a clear semantic meaning, allowing the IDS
operator to set and adapt their values intuitively to adjust the
overall performance of the IDS. We tested the proposed IDS on
two (one closed and one public) datasets, and proved its efficiency
in terms of AUC (area under the ROC curve). Our work showed
the “flow size difference” has a great potential to improve the
performance of any flow-based network IDSs.
Index Terms—Network traffic, network flow, TCP, intrusion
detection, IDS, network security, Benford’s law.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE advances of networking technologies have made thewhole world (computes, people and things) far more
connected than before, but the increasing connectivity has also
lead to more opportunities to malicious attackers who find
various ways to launch cyber attacks such as distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks [1], botnets [2], network worms [3],
and phishing attacks (e.g. phishing emails and rogue WiFi
access points) [4]. The increasing harm of network attacks
have become so severe that such attacks have been becoming
more and more frequent and sophisticated [5], [6].
To reduce and prevent harm that can be caused by network
attacks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been studied
by researchers and deployed by organizations in real world
to detect potential attacks automatically [7], [8]. IDSs can
be classified into network-based IDSs and host-based IDSs,
which differ from each other in where the detector is deployed
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and what activities the detector is monitoring to make alerts.
Network-based IDSs are deployed within a network and mon-
itor network traffic passing by to identify potential attacks that
may target any hosts of the network, while host-based IDSs are
deployed on individual hosts (e.g. key servers and individual
devices) and monitor local activities (local processes, incoming
and outgoing network traffic) to detect signs of suspicious
behaviors. This paper focuses on network-based IDSs.
According to how network-based IDSs detect attacks tech-
nically, they can be classified into four general categories:
misuse-based, anomaly-based, specification-based, and hybrid
systems [7], [8]. Misused-based IDSs are largely based on
defined patterns (sometimes called “signatures”) of known
attacks so the detection process is around checking if any
known patterns are matched. This approach has the advantage
of producing very few false positives but it cannot be general-
ized to cover unknown attacks. On the other hand, anomaly-
based IDSs are based on learned normal activity profiles of
the network traffic (for network-based IDSs) and the system
(for host-based IDSs), so anything deviating from normal
behavior will be labelled as suspicious, which can cover totally
unknown attacks but also unusual non-malicious activities.
Specification-based IDSs are very similar to anomaly-based
IDSs but here the normal profiles are specified rather than
learned. As its name implies, hybrid IDSs combine different
approaches (typically a misused-based component for known
attacks and an anomaly-based component for unknown at-
tacks) to overcome limitations of other simple approaches.
Some researchers prefer other terms e.g. Debar et al. suggested
using knowledge- and behavior-based IDSs for misuse- and
anomaly-based IDSs [9], and Drasˇar et al. proposed to classify
(flow-based) IDSs based on the concept of similarity [10].
According to the network traffic data used, network-based
IDSs can also be classified into packet- and flow-based ap-
proaches [11]–[13]. Packet-based IDSs look at all packets
passing by in the network traffic, but flow-based IDSs analyze
characteristics of network flows (a sequence of network pack-
ets). Flow-based IDSs are computationally far more efficient,
but have a coarser temporal resolution in locating attacks and
can miss important information related to application-level
attacks. Flow-based IDSs also have the advantage that they can
adapt to different/evolving network infrastructure more easily
and are considered more privacy-friendly as packet content
recording and inspection are avoided [14].
A lot of network-based IDSs have employed statistical
2approaches to detecting signs of attacks, and some natural
statistical laws such as Zipf’s law, Benford’s law, the Pareto
distribution and the Weibull distribution [15]–[18] have been
explored to generate statistical features for IDS purposes [19]–
[28]. The term “natural” refers to the fact that many natural
processes often follow them while artificially created ones
tend to not. Since attacks are normally artificially crafted and
mostly generate “unnatural” network traffic, those natural laws
can often form the basis (or part) of an anomaly-based IDS.
In this paper, we report our observation that a new network
flow metric we call “flow size difference” follows Benford’s
law closely for normal TCP flows but not for malicious ones.
We then propose a new method of applying Benford’s law
to this new metric to build an unsupervised network-based
IDS to detect malicious TCP flows. In addition to having
all merits of flow-based IDSs, our proposed IDS does not
require any training and it provides two simple operational
parameters with a clear semantic meaning so that the IDS
operator can set and tailor the parameters intuitively to adjust
the performance of the proposed IDS. The main limitation
of the proposed method is that it requires a relatively large
time window of flows (to provide statistical confidence) so its
temporal resolution is relatively low, but this can be overcome
by combining it with other IDSs with a higher temporal
resolution (e.g. using the proposed method to detect regions of
interest which are then further analyzed using other methods).
The proposed IDS was inspired by our observations on a large
number of TCP flow datasets, and its performance was verified
with two (one closed and one public) datasets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we overview related work on Benford’s law and other
related natural laws and statistical IDSs. Section III gives a
brief explanation to the concept “network flow” and explains
how we define TCP flows in our work. In Sec. IV we introduce
the basic concept behind the new metric “flow size difference”
and explain how Benford’s law can be applied to measure
(un)naturalness of TCP flows to distinguish malicious flows
from normal ones. Section V presents some experimental
evidence on the usefulness of Benford’s law based naturalness
detector with a number of selected network traffic datasets with
normal, malicious and mixed TCP flows. Then, in Sec. VI
we report the experimental results of using the proposed
naturalness detector to build a simple and fast threshold-based
IDS, which was applied to one closed and one public datasets
to show its potential as a new element for designing network
IDSs. We discuss operational advantages and limitations of
the proposed methods and how it can be combined with other
methods in Sec. VII, with our planned future work. Finally,
the last section concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Benford’s Law
The first known description of Benford’s law was given
by Simon Newcomb in 1881 [29], but Newcomb’s work was
largely forgotten and later “rediscovered” and studied more
systematically by Frank Benford in 1938 [30].1 The simple
form of the law states that the first digits of many real-life sets
of numerical data follow the following probability distribution:
Pd = log10
(
1 + d−1
)
, (1)
where d = 1, . . . , 9 (each possible value of the first digit)
and Pd denotes the probability of d. This simple form can be
generalized to other bases other than 10 and other significant
digits other than the first one [17], [32].
Researchers have proposed different explanations to why
Benford’a law arises in real-life datasets [33]–[35]. One gen-
eral agreement is that Benford’s law applies to numbers with
a scale-invariant distribution [33], [34], but a complete and
convincing theoretical explanation remains unsettled due to
some mathematical subtleties as described in [36].
Although Benford’s law holds for many real-life datasets, it
is not a universal law as there are many exceptions. There are
also some other statistical laws / distributions which are closely
linked to Benford’s law, such as the Stigler distribution [37],
Zipf’s law, the Pareto distribution [15], [16], [38], the Weibull
distribution [18] and a generalized Benford’s law with two
added tunable parameters [39].
Due to the fact that real-life datasets in many different fields
follow Benford’s law, it has found diverse applications in many
applications reflected from the huge number of publications
spreading across many disciplines [40], [41]. Particularly,
Benford’s Law has been one of the most-studied natural laws
for fraud detection [42]–[44] and multimedia forensics [39],
[45]–[48], which have close links to IDSs. Some researchers
also proposed some generalized forms of Benford’s law to
adapt to solve practical problems, e.g., Fu et al. [39] proposed
a generalized Benford’s law with two tunable parameters to
fit the multimedia forensics data they were studying.
B. IDS
We have briefly discussed the general classification of IDSs
in the Introduction, and here we will focus mainly on statistical
methods particularly those based on natural statistical laws and
applied to build anomaly-based IDSs.
Theoretically speaking, statistics play a foundational role
for all IDSs (even for methods not based on statistics directly)
because an IDS’s performance is essentially based on statistics
of normal and malicious activities [49]. As a matter of fact,
there is an implicit or explicit assumption that attack activities
are statistically different from normal ones [8]. Another exam-
ple is that all IDSs face a well-known issue called “base-rate
fallacy”: the probability of any malicious event takes place in
the whole range of activities is generally very small and the
benign activities almost always dominate over a relatively long
period of time, which can lead to foundational difficulties in
the design, development and testing of IDSs [50], e.g. it can
be practically difficult to get sufficient attack data to train and
test an IDS based on supervised learning methods [10], [51].
1Some researchers prefer calling the law Newcomb-Benford Law (NBL)
[31], but Benford’s law remains the mostly used term. As a matter of fact, in
[29] Newcomb actually implied that the law as an approximate phenomenon
had been known to most people who frequently used logarithmic tables.
3To apply any statistical methods, one needs to have at least
one random variable which can be observed over time and
modeled by the IDS. In his seminal paper on anomaly-based
IDSs [52] Denning called such random variables metrics,
which will be the term we follow in this paper. The metric(s)
chosen should allow normal and malicious activities to differ
from each other statistically so that two different statistical
models can be built to support classification. The observed
samples of a selected metric may be used directly for classi-
fication purposes, but they can also be aggregated to derive
other higher-level indicators (e.g. mean, standard deviation
and entropy) before the classification step takes place. Here
we use the term features to denote those indicators fed into a
classification system for making decisions, which is a standard
term used by the machine learning community to call data feed
into a (statistical or non-statistical) classifier.
While the statistical models of selected metrics do not have
to be based on any assumed distributions (as argued by Den-
ning [52]), many researchers noticed some metrics taken from
non-malicious network traffic follow some known distributions
closely but those from malicious deviate significantly [19]–
[28]. Those distributions studied include Zipf’s law, the Pareto
distribution, the Weibull distribution and also Benford’s law.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Benford’s Law has been
widely used for fraud detection and digital forensics, there
has been very limited work on applying Benford’s law to
IDS. The first work we are aware of was done by Hamadeh
in his 2004 master’s thesis [20]. In his work he looked at
three candidate metrics: the number of hits of webserver, the
number of bytes transmitted in the response, and the inter-
arrival time between two consecutive visits. He observed that
the inter-arrival time followed Benford’s law better than the
other two. Hamadeh mentioned the possibility of applying the
observation to an IDS, but fell short of actually conducting
any experiment. Note that Hamadeh’s work is not network
flow based, but around activities of visiting a webserver.
The only another work (and the only work on flow-based
IDS) we could find is due to Arshadi and Jahangir [53] who
showed that the inter-arrival time of two consecutive normal
TCP flows Benford’s law closely so an IDS can be built on
top of this fact. They conducted some manual inspection on
selected malicious flows, but did not build an actual IDS so
its actual performance is unclear. Arshadi and Jahangir also
studied the source of Benford’s law and attributed it to the
fact that normal TCP flows’ inter-arrival time closely follows
the Weibull distribution, which can derive Benford’s law. In
[28], Arshadi and Jahangir also studied using the Weibull
distribution with the inter-arrival time for IDS purposes, and
provided some results on the actual performance of such an
IDS.
III. NETWORK FLOWS AND TCP FLOWS
Before discussing our work in greater details, we clarify a
bit more about what we mean by “TCP flows” and “network
flows” in general. IDS researchers do not have a consistent
understanding on these two terms and different flow-based
IDSs can use very different definitions of network flows.
Loosely speaking, a (network) flow, sometimes called a
session, a stream, or a conversation, is a sequence of network
packets sharing some common criteria such as two end-point
IP addresses over the Internet [12], [54]–[56]. In principle,
the concept can be applied to any network protocol at any
layer of a network. This concept has been widely used for
network traffic monitoring purposes, and a specific protocol
called NetFlow working at the IP layer was popularized by
Cisco due to its widely deployed routers, which was later
developed into IPFIX (Internet Protocol Flow Information
Export) [56]. A flow does not necessarily correspond to a
single communication session as defined by the underlying
protocol, e.g. Fredj et al. [54] defined a flow as a collection
of packets transmitting a complete document (such as a web
page) and one definition Barakat et al. used in [54] is “a stream
of packets having the same/24 destination address prefix”.
While there are many different ways to define a network
flow, one of the most common definitions uses the following
five criteria: source and destination IP addresses, source and
destination port numbers (0 for protocols that do not use ports),
and protocol type. When we talk about “source” and “destina-
tion” it is clear that the flow defined is unidirectional, which
is the case for NetFlow and IPFIX flows. However, as Bejtlich
pointed out in [12], connection-oriented protocols (e.g. TCP)
are more suited to be represented as a flow as compared to
connectionless protocols (e.g. IP, UDP and ICMP). This is
because the former are structured in such a way that there
exists a clear beginning, middle, and end to a flow, whereas the
latter are not structured around the concept of connections so
often time expiration conditions have to be used to arbitrarily
set flow boundaries. For connection-oriented protocols, each
connection corresponds to a bidirectional flow which is the
merge of two unidirectional flows.
In flow-based IDSs different flow definitions are used.
IP flows defined following NetFlow or IPFIX specifications
are widely used [57] since such flow information can often
be obtained directly from routers and supported by open-
source tools such as NFDUMP and NfSen [58], [59]. Some
researchers focused on bidirectional TCP flows only [53],
which can be justified by the fact that most IP traffic over
the Internet is TCP traffic (e.g. in [60] the ratio was reported
to be 95.112%).
In this paper, we also focused on bidirectional TCP flows
as Arshadi and Jahangir did in their work on [53] considering
the dominance of TCP flows on the Internet and the fact that
network flows are less well-defined for IP and other connec-
tionless protocols. Note that selecting TCP flows naturally
cover all application-layer protocols based on TCP (such as
HTTP, the dominating protocol at the application layer [60]).
When working with a pcap file captured by libpacap or
WinPcap, the TCP flows we work with can be generated using
the following command line with tshark (part of WireShark ):
tshark -r <input pcap file> -q -z
conv,tcp > <output file>.
The output file will then contain a list of “TCP conver-
sations” which is a term used by WireShark to denote TCP
4flows.2 In WireShark ’s user interface, TCP flows of a given
network traffic dataset can be obtained via the menu item
“Statistics” → “Conversation” and then click “TCP” tab. Then
the TCP flows shown in the interface can be exported using
“Copy” button at the bottom. The TCP flows obtained this
way contain the following attributes (those in boldface are
essential for our work): source IP address, source port number,
destination IP address, destination port number, total number
of packets transferred between source and destination,
total number of bytes transferred between source and des-
tination, packets transferred from source to destination, bytes
transferred from source to destination, packets transferred
from destination to source, bytes transferred from destination
to source, relative start time (as a timestamp, 0 = the
beginning of the whole network traffic), duration, source-to-
destination bitrate (bit per second), and destination-to-source
bitrate. When working with other network traffic data, as long
as we can extract the above attributes of each TCP flow in
boldface, our proposed method will work without any problem.
IV. OUR PROPOSED METHOD
In this section we will describe the basic concepts behind
the IDS based on Benford’s law and the new metric “flow size
difference” and different aspects we need to consider around
the proposed IDS.
A. IDS Structure and Component
We consider the typical structure of an anomaly-based IDS
working with TCP flows. It starts with one or more selected
metrics which should follow Benford’s law closely for normal
TCP flows but deviate from it significantly and consistently for
malicious ones. Then, a number of samples of each selected
metric will be collected (one per TCP flow) to detect any
significant deviation from Benford’s law, where we will use a
sliding window to cover a sufficient number of TCP flows (i.e.,
samples of the metric) so that any deviation can be detected
with high confidence and an acceptable temporal resolution
(which will help to tailor the detection accuracy as well espe-
cially to balance false positive and false negative rates). The
flow window size W will be an important system parameter,
and it can be fixed or dynamically adapted depending on the
nature of the networking environment being monitored. The
deviation will be calculated based on a similarity metric be-
tween the Benford’s law and the actually observed distribution,
which is used as a feature for a binary classifier to classify
each flow window into two classes: normal (non-malicious),
or attack (malicious).
If we have more than one usable metric, each one can be
used alone or they can be combined to inform a classifier
handling multiple features or the alerts generated from each
metric are pooled to derive a single decision. In this paper, we
look at a simpler setting: each usable metric is used alone and
a simple threshold T is used to construct a binary classifier.
We go for the simpler setting because our main goal here is to
2WireShark uses another term “TCP stream” to denote the payload of a
“TCP conversation”. To avoid confusion we will use the term “TCP flow”
consistently in this paper.
identify new metrics that can work with any IDS to improve its
performance rather than to produce yet another IDS competing
with other systems. We actually do not anticipate our IDS will
outperform many more complicated IDSs due to its simplistic
structure. To some extent, the proposed IDS structure is used
to set up a proper context so that we can test the usefulness of
the proposed new metrics in more complicated IDSs. In our
future work we will look at more complicated settings and
how the identified new metrics can be used to improve other
IDSs. We will discuss more about these issues in Sec. VII.
B. The Metrics
As mentioned above, the first and the most important
component of our IDS is at least one metric that can work
with Benford’s law. Since we aim at identifying new metrics,
we do not look at the inter-arrival time already studied by other
researchers [53]. Looking at the attributes of a TCP flow listed
at the end of Sec. III, we identified two candidate metrics that
have not been previously studied for IDS:
1) Flow size: : The flow size distribution has been studied
extensively in the networking literature and estimation of flow
size distribution has been an active research topic [61], [62]. It
has been known that the flow size distribution is typically long-
tailed and its exact form heavily depends on the underlying
protocol and the networking environment [63]. Flow size dis-
tribution has been been studied in IDS research but mostly for
entropy-based approaches where the entropy of the observed
distribution is calculated as a feature for detection [64], [65].
We were unaware of work linking flow size distribution to
Benford’s law so found it interesting to investigate flow size
as a potential metric for applying Benford’s law to IDS.
2) Flow size difference: : In addition to flow size, we also
noticed that the “flow size difference”, which is defined as the
numeric difference of two consecutive TCP flows’ sizes, seems
to be another potential metric of interest because it inherits
some features of flow size (e.g. long-tailedness) but differs
significantly from the flow size itself. We did not find any
work on the distribution of flow size difference of TCP flows
or on its application in IDS3, which is not totally surprising
since the flow size difference does not seem to be obviously
useful for network traffic analysis and management purposes.
However, our experiments revealed that it seemed to follow
Benford’s law well, so we added it as a candidate. For the
flow size difference, we will ignore the sign bit so the metric
we are considering here is actually the absolute value of the
flow size difference. In the following, we will simply use the
term “flow size difference” to denote the absolute value unless
otherwise stated.
Note that the flow size can be defined by bytes or packets,
so we actually have two different variants for each of the above
two candidate metrics. These two variants are not linked but
cannot be directly derived from each other since the packet
size (in byte) varies over time and cross applications.
3If we know the flow size distribution, it is possible to derive the distribution
of the flow size difference assuming the flow size is an i.i.d. sequence which
is unfortunately not the case for most cases.
5C. From Flows to Flow Windows
Since Benford’s law is a distribution, we need to collect
enough samples of a given metric to be able to construct an
observed distribution which then can be compared against the
target distribution for detecting any deviation. This is why
we need to have a flow window for any distribution-based
IDSs, which is a well-known fact. Since the Benford’s law
distribution has only 9 values, it can be expected that the
minimum flow window size will not be very large so that the
temporal resolution of the IDS will not be too low. We will
report our experimental results in Sec. V on how the value
of W can be determined. In addition to the parameter flow
window size W , there is also another one “window sliding
step” S which defines how much the flow window slides
at one time. In principle S can range from 1 to W , and
taking a smaller value can potentially help refine the temporal
resolution to some extent. In our work, we take S = W/2 as
a representative value.
D. Flow Ordering
For the flow size difference, changing ordering of flows
will obviously change each sample of the metric and thus its
observed distribution. For the flow size, the flow ordering will
not make a direct difference, but can influence what flows
are included in each flow window thus influence the observed
distribution. It is therefore a valid question to ask if such
orderings will make a difference and if so how we should order
flows. Looking at all the attributes of a TCP flow, we selected
the following four typical ordering options for consideration:
1) (Start Time, End Time)
2) (End Time, Start Time)
3) (Source IP address, Destination IP address, Start Time)
4) (Source IP address, Source Port number, Destination IP
address, Destination Port number, Start Time)
Each attribute in the above ordering option is considered from
the left to right. For flows with the same values for all ordering
criteria, the original order in the raw network traffic log will be
kept. Since Benford’s law is a natural law and scale-invariant,
we hypothesized that the ordering should not have a big impact
on the compliance with (for normal flows) or deviation from
(for malicious flows) Benford’s law. Our experimental results
will be given in Sec. V.
E. Zero Handling
For the flow size difference we have to consider a special
issue: zero is now a possible value since two consecutive flows
can have the same size (which is highly likely in some attacks
such as DDoS and port scanning). Since Benford’s law does
not actually cover the digit zero, we need to handle such zero
flow size differences properly to avoid system crashing and
false detections. There are several options we can consider: 1)
skipping all zeros; 2) extending Benford’s law to cover digit
zero, i.e., simply add P (0) = 0 into the target distribution so
now we have 10 digits to consider (but 0 should never appear).
The first option is trivial to implement but may lose important
information about a specific pattern (repeated flows of the
same size) around some attacks. The second option looks
trivial to implement but has one non-trivial issue regarding
how we can measure goodness of fit and deviation from
Benford’s law which will be discussed in the next subsection.
F. Measuring Goodness of Fit / Deviation
To check the goodness of fit to and deviation from the target
distribution described by Benford’s law, we need a proper
similarity metric4. One of the most commonly-used metrics in
applications of Benford’s law is the χ2 divergence [39], [45]–
[48] which can be defined for Benford’s law case as follows:
χ2 =
9∑
d=1
(Pˆd − Pd)
2
Pd
, (2)
where Pd is the probability of first digit d defined in Benford’s
law as in Eq. (1) and Pˆd is the actually observed probability
of d. It is effectively the test statistic of Pearson’s χ2 test [66]
against the target distribution.
In the IDS context, there are many other similarity metrics
one can use for the goodness of fit / deviation test. In a
2015 survey [67] Weller-Fahy et al. gave a very compre-
hensive overview of this topic, classifying different metrics
used in network-based IDSs into four categories: 1) power
distances (e.g. Euclidean distance and Manhattan distance), 2)
distances on distribution laws (e.g. χ2 divergence, Kullback-
Leiber divergence, and entropy-based metrics), 3) correlation
similarities (e.g. Spearman ρ rank correlation, Kendal τ rank
correlation, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient,
and the cosine similarity), and 4) other metrics (e.g. dice
similarity and Geodesic distance).
In our initial experiments investigating the potential of
Benford’s law (as reported in Sec. V), we stuck to the
χ2 divergence. In the performance evaluation of the IDS
we also tested the following metrics in order to find out
if there are significant differences when different metrics
are used: Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance, Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficient, and cosine similarity.
Although all similarity metrics are well-known, we list them
below for the sake of completeness (all tailored for Benford’s
law following notations in Eq. (2)).
• Euclidean distance:
ED =
√∑9
d=1
(
Pˆd − Pd
)2
• Manhattan distance:
MD =
∑9
d=1
∣∣∣Pˆd − Pd∣∣∣
• Canberra distance:
CD =
∑9
d=1
∣∣∣Pˆd − Pd∣∣∣
Pˆd + Pd
4In this paper we use the term “metric” loosely without following the
rigorous definition of metrics in mathematics.
6• Pearson product-moment correlation linear coefficient (x
denotes the mean of x):
CC =
∑9
d=1
(
Pˆd − Pˆd
)∑9
d=1
(
Pd − Pd
)
√∑9
d=1
(
Pˆd − Pˆd
)2√∑9
d=1
(
Pd − Pd
)2
• Cosine similarity:
CS =
∑
9
d=1
(
PˆdPd
)
√∑
9
d=1
Pˆ 2
d
√∑
9
d=1
P 2
d
When Benford’s law is extended to cover d = 0, some
of the above metrics can still be used by just changing the
starting index d = 1 to 0. For metrics where P (d) appears as
the denominator (i.e., χ2 divergence), we have to skip P (0)
as this can cause singularity, but this does not mean the effect
of zero flow size differences are ignored as a non-zero Pˆ0 will
reduce the probability of all other digits so can still lead to a
difference in the similarity metric calculated.
In addition to the above metrics, we also considered
Kullback-Leiber divergence since it is also widely used to
measure differences between distributions. Kullback-Leiber
divergence is actually not a proper similarity metric for the
purpose of this study because the underlying assumption, ∀d,
Pd = 0→ Pˆd = 0, is not guaranteed to hold in real world. In
addition, although d = 0 is not counted in Benford’s law, it
can appear for the flow size difference and in the extreme case
one can have Pˆ0 = 1, Pˆ1 = · · · = Pˆ9 = 0 (which does happen
for some datasets). Therefore, we propose to use a modified
edition of Kullback-Leiber divergence by introducing a new
term to count the effect of first digit 0 more properly:
KLD∗ = Pˆ0θKLD +
√√√√∑9
d=1
Pˆd log2
(
Pˆd
Pd
)
, (3)
where θKLD is a parameter representing the unit contribution
of digit 0 to the final divergence value, i.e., representing the
ill-defined term log2(Pˆ0/P0) = ∞. In our experiments, we
used θKLD = 2 log2(1/P9) following the heuristic assumption
that the contribution of Pˆ0 = 1 to the divergence is twice as
large as that of Pˆ9 = 1. This proved sufficient to make the
modified KLD a good metric for all cases of our IDS.
V. INITIAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe some initial experiments we
conducted to test the two types of new metrics (flow size
and flow size difference), leading to the conclusion that the
flow size difference is a promising new metric for IDS. The
performance evaluation of the IDS based on the flow size
difference will be reported in Sec. VI.
A. Network Traffic Datasets Used
To properly test the new metrics, we used three groups of
network traffic datasets in our experiments. The first group
are datasets that do not contain known malicious traffic
(so considered normal/non-malicious). The second group are
datasets containing known malicious traffic. The third group
are datasets with mixed traffic with both malicious and non-
malicious flows. All datasets were pre-processed using tshark
to get bidirectional TCP flows.
Non-malicious datasets we considered include:
1) LBNL/ICSI dataset [68]: We used the whole dataset
(442,623 TCP flows).
2) UNB ISCX 2012 intrusion detection evaluation dataset
[60], [69]: We used two files with non-malicious traffic
on Friday 11 June, 2010 (297,398 TCP flows) and on
Wednesday 16 June, 2010 (434,674 TCP flows).
3) TLERH dataset described in [70]: We used a file of this
dataset obtained from the authors of [70] (with 16,321
TCP flows).
4) Labeled network flow data from the University of
Twente [71], [72]: We used non-malicious data traffic
in this dataset (12 separate files, in total 1,373,786 TCP
flows).
Malicious datasets we considered include:
1) Capture the hacker 2013 competition dataset [73]–[75]:
This dataset contains three separate PCAP files called
NAPENTHES, HONEYBOT, and AMAZON, which
contain 5,440 TCP flows in total.
2) 2009 Inter-Service Academy CDX dataset [76]: We used
502,412 TCP flows from this dataset.
3) MACCDC dataset [77]: We randomly picked 4 files from
this dataset (with 11807, 65536, 9765 and 23949 TCP
flows, respectively).
4) Labeled network flow data from the University of
Twente [71], [72]: We used all malicious traffic in this
dataset (13,276,385 TCP flows).
5) Traffic data from Kyoto University’s honeypots [78],
[79]: We used four files from this dataset (recorded on
1 to 4 November, 2006, with 11807, 124816, 9765, and
23494 flows, respectively).
We used two datasets with mixed traffic:
• UNB ISCX 2012 intrusion detection dataset [60], [69]:
We used mixed traffic on five dates: 1) 12 June, 2010
(95,177 TCP flows including 2,082 malicious flows);
2) 13 June, 2010 (221,026 TCP flows including 20,358
malicious flows); 3) 14 June, 2010 (122,298 TCP flows
including 3,771 malicious flows); 4) 15 June, 2010
(441,563 TCP flows including 37,378 malicious flows);
and 5) 17 June, 2010 (329,378 TCP flows including 5,203
malicious flows).
• ISOT dataset [80], [81]: We used 40,000 flows extracted
from the dataset.
B. Flow Size or Flow Size Difference?
The first initial experiment we conducted is to determine
if both flow size and flow size difference are promising
metrics for IDS purposes. We use one dataset from each
of the three groups to gain insights about their potentials.
Table I summarizes the results, which show that the flow size
difference seems to follow Benford’s law better than the flow
size although for both cases the expected order of the χ2
divergence values were observed: non-malicious < mixed <
7malicious. We also repeated this experiment with some other
datasets and observed largely the same pattern, therefore we
decided to chose the flow size difference for other experiments.
The potential of using the flow size is not totally excluded but
we leave it for our future work.
C. How to Determine Flow Window Size?
As we discussed in the previous section, the flow window
size W is a parameter of the IDS which can allow some level
of performance control. While we expected that W does not
need to be too large, we need some indication of how we
can set it. For a selected dataset (LBNL/ICSI dataset), we
calculated the average χ2 divergence value of all flow windows
when W changes from 500 to 20,000, increasing with a step
size of 250. Figure 1 shows the results. As can be seen, the
average χ2 divergence value decreases rapidly initially but the
decreasing rate keeps dropping while W increases. Note that
the initial divergence value is also very small (below 0.02)
so the results suggest that W can probably be set to a value
between several hundreds or thousands in most cases.
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Fig. 1. Change of χ2 divergence w.r.t. the flow window size W .
D. Flow Ordering
Another experiment was conducted to check if the flow
ordering can change how the flow size difference follows Ben-
ford’s law. For non-malicious flows in the LBNL/ICSI dataset,
the average χ2 divergence values for all four ordering options
listed in Sec. IV-D are: 0.0094497, 0.0086003, 0.0087495
and 0.0073707, all below 0.01. For malicious flows in the
HONEYBOT dataset, the average χ2 divergence values are
0.04102922, 0.039240332, 0.039630320 and 0.036690744, all
above 0.03. Repeated experiments on other malicious and non-
malicious datasets gave similar results, so we can see that the
flow ordering does not really change the χ2 divergence value
much, thus suggesting that the flow size difference is a robust
metric against flow ordering.
E. Other Settings
Our experiments on the two different zero handling options
suggested that Benford’s law largely works in both cases,
although there are indications that for skipping zeros can lead
to more fluctuations of the divergence value. Similarly, for the
two different variants of the flow size difference metric (flow
size as number of byte and number of packet), we observed
that both worked reasonably well with Benford’s law. Further
testing of these settings can be better done via the performance
evaluation on the IDS, which we report in Sec. VI.
F. More Results on Different Datasets
The above experiments clarified that the flow size differ-
ence seems a good metric working with Benford’s law. To
test its potential further, we ran a large-scale experiment to
calculate χ2 divergence values for a large number of TCP
flow windows of many datasets in all the three groups. We
used two representative window size (2,000 and 10,000) and
a sliding window step 1 in order to get sufficient data to look
at statistics of the χ2 divergence values. Tables II, III and
IV show the results for the three different groups of datasets,
respectively. Note that the χ2 divergence values of different
datasets should not be compared directly as those datasets cor-
respond to completely different networking environments and
capturing methods. Despite the diversity of the datasets and the
observable fluctuations of the χ2 divergence values especially
the maximum values, largely speaking the χ2 divergence value
does have a high tendency to following the following order:
non-malicious < mixed < malicious. This suggests that the
flow size difference may indeed be a good metric for building
an anomaly-based IDS for detecting malicious TCP flows.
VI. IDS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we provide details of our further experiments
to evaluate the performance of a simple IDS built on top
of the identified flow size difference metric. As we men-
tioned above, the IDS has only one metric and its structure
is simple, so our goal is not to make it outperform other
more complicated IDSs but to provide direct evidence that
even with such a single metric the IDS has a reasonably
good performance so it has the potential to be used together
with other known metrics and methods to design flow-based
network IDSs with an even better overall performance. Due to
many well-known and complicated issues around performance
evaluation of IDSs [10], [51], [82], it is actually not trivial
to compare performance of multiple IDSs fairly even if we
want. Although we will not report comparative results with
other IDSs, we chose to release our source code so that other
IDS researchers can easily verify the results we reported and
incorporate our work into other IDSs to conduct further per-
formance analysis. Our source code was written in MATLAB
and can be downloaded from http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/
Data/BenfordsLawIDS/source code.7z. Note that the source
code is written to produce the performance evaluation results
reported in this section, rather than as a ready-to-use IDS, but
it is straightforward to translate our code into a deployable
IDS or incorporate our code into an existing IDS written in
any programming language.
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χ2 DIVERGENCE VALUES FOR THE FLOW SIZE VS. THE FLOW SIZE DIFFERENCE AS THE METRIC.
Dataset (File) MetricFlow Size Flow Size Difference
Non-malicious traffic: LBNL/ICSI 0.02577 0.00088
Malicious traffic: Capture Hacker (HONEYBOT) 0.12128 0.03999
Mixed traffic: ISCX 2012 (13 June, 2010) 0.04633 0.00603
TABLE II
χ2 DIVERGENCE VALUES FOR DATASETS WITH NON-MALICIOUS TCP FLOWS.
Dataset (File) Window-Size χ
2 divergence
Average Median Minimum Maximum
LBNL/ICSI 2000 0.06087285 0.02200721 0.000367677 3.72605
10000 0.023379069 0.01456664 0.000836337 0.14195
ISCX 2012 (11 June, 2010) 2000 0.035543556 0.03086359 0.005292382 0.11853
10000 0.024754012 0.02432506 0.014170007 0.03895
ISCX 2012 (12 June, 2010) 2000 0.076106490 0.03924496 0.001458041 0.78477
10000 0.043883460 0.03095162 0.003635401 0.18417
TLERH 2000 0.062321612 0.04681540 0.008825445 0.17574
10000 0.047089776 0.04599299 0.036788053 0.05863
Twente
(loc1-20020523-1835) 2000 0.010627572 0.00900225 0.001288395 0.03760
10000 0.005360776 0.00533056 0.002594503 0.00928
(loc1-20020524-1115) 2000 0.008654660 0.00792808 0.001701887 0.02546
10000 0.003225103 0.00302386 0.001037643 0.00657
(loc2-20030513-1005) 2000 0.017321427 0.01579575 0.003077555 0.05431
10000 0.006945227 0.00694522 0.006945227 0.00694
(loc2-20030513-1044) 2000 0.045903123 0.04062594 0.015966573 0.09972
10000 0.029621174 0.02962117 0.029621174 0.02962
(loc3-20030902-0930) 2000 0.018619384 0.01775061 0.004399072 0.03852
10000 0.012487729 0.01280767 0.008713071 0.01677
(loc3-20030902-1005) 2000 0.015866801 0.01588986 0.002744006 0.03715
10000 0.011495219 0.01157011 0.006588404 0.01691
(loc4-20040204-2145) 2000 0.017711165 0.01771116 0.001162426 0.04583
10000 0.013173468 0.01434036 0.001360714 0.02149
(loc4-20040205-0410) 2000 0.020032510 0.01927031 0.002402937 0.05800
10000 0.015180323 0.01636191 0.001294423 0.02562
(loc5-20031205-1431) 2000 0.047492841 0.04569088 0.013472842 0.09680
10000 0.042015498 0.04209131 0.030077191 0.05689
(loc5-20031206-0731) 2000 0.089616951 0.08408784 0.048919967 0.18055
10000 0.070355597 0.07111595 0.061251126 0.07703
(loc6-20070501-2055) 2000 0.060355909 0.04262247 0.003198521 0.74357
10000 0.040565069 0.03629526 0.011316646 0.14548
(loc6-20070531-2043) 2000 0.064672661 0.04806397 0.003572854 0.90961
10000 0.048209326 0.03963367 0.009129598 0.19327
A. Datasets Used
As pointed out by many other IDS researchers [10], [51],
[82], there is a general lack of public labelled datasets for
evaluating and comparing performance of IDSs. The two
mostly-used datasets in the past were the DARPA dataset [83]
released in 1999 (and updated in 2000 with some specific
scenarios), and the KDD Cup 1999 dataset [84] which was
derived from the DARPA dataset. Both datasets have serious
design flaws known to the IDS community for a long time
e.g. those attacks presented in the dataset are very out-dated.
Their use is in general discouraged and most researchers go
for closed datasets obtained from their own networks or from
industrial collaborators, which are seldom made public thus
making reproduction of published results impossible. There
are some recent efforts of creating new public labelled IDS
datasets [72], [85], [86], but none of them do not have their
own drawbacks.
For our work here, we decided to use a closed dataset
we call “TRT dataset” hereinafter, which was provided by
Thales UK, Research and Technology (TRT) for this research.
The TRT dataset contains 17 days of network traffic from a
medium-sized network. In total there are 430,939 TCP flows.
The dataset contains two subsets. The first subset was captured
in a simulated network, with long periods of (simulated)
normal traffic and occasional attacks of different types. The
“inet” probe was located at the boundary of the network, to
intercept all traffic entering and leaving the network from the
Internet. The second subset was from a real student cyber
security laboratory. It contains a lot of background traffic
when the students were not there, but this was largely UDP
traffic and hence not used in our experiments. When the
students were there, they were doing a lot of (simulated)
9TABLE III
χ2 DIVERGENCE VALUES FOR DATASETS WITH MALICIOUS TCP FLOWS.
Dataset (File) Window-Size χ
2 divergence
Average Median Minimum Maximum
Capture Hacker
(HONEYBOT) 2000 0.359898126 0.35989812 0.359898126 0.35989
(AMAZON) 2000 0.541314000 0.66659157 0.291432604 0.77217
(NAPENTHES) 2000 0.702143438 0.70214343 0.702143438 0.70214
2009 CDX
(dmp1) 2000 0.416678762 0.39091630 0.155110896 0.70031
(dmp2) 2000 0.531123191 0.45437578 0.235682400 1.03259
(dmp3) 2000 1.290143507 0.54403769 0.149578337 8.31071
(dmp4) 2000 0.608195471 0.57431954 0.574319544 1.24340
(35dump*) 2000 3.611008194 1.08928715 0.059356144 12.1582
(35dump2*) 2000 0.531123191 0.45437578 0.235682400 1.03259
MACCDC
(MACC1) 2000 0.561998014 0.49849047 0.030903985 2.48297820141
10000 0.361823385 0.31002427 0.093006551 0.66489076768
(MACC2) 2000 0.316137172 0.34970931 0.044942870 0.73696376246
10000 0.302343885 0.33391531 0.077787425 0.48066011763
(MACC3) 2000 0.479926028 0.51570687 0.079583727 1.33988196727
10000 0.279381711 0.27938171 0.279381711 0.27938171156
(MACC4) 2000 0.452494598 0.41510598 0.029984994 1.61375634415
10000 0.317442530 0.24475004 0.047428552 0.91769942126
Twente 2000 0.517489073 0.42960371 0.131377693 2.322259
10000 0.354369539 0.37784575 0.134733907 0.58659
Kyoto
(20061101) 2000 0.107162457 0.09849514 0.029682783 0.22778
(20061102) 2000 1.069680688 1.00134293 0.100525961 3.163229
(20061103) 2000 0.108852843 0.11355006 0.058599317 0.19626716314
(20061104) 2000 0.370117226 0.44502530 0.071407197 0.61333268918
TABLE IV
χ2 DIVERGENCE VALUES FOR DATASETS WITH MIXED MALICIOUS AND NON-MALICIOUS TCP FLOWS.
Dataset (File) Window-Size χ
2 divergence
Average Median Minimum Maximum
ISCX 2012
(13 June, 2010) 2000 0.270556952 0.10817436 0.005356864 2.32225
10000 0.194346177 0.08364604 0.022479027 2.24784
(14 June, 2015) 2000 0.100901660 0.04324848 0.003802617 0.91445
10000 0.063876498 0.03732686 0.010087834 0.37501
(15 June, 2015) 2000 0.125542348 0.05355104 0.001430369 0.83598
10000 0.105044000 0.04077830 0.005300968 0.58069
(17 June, 2015) 2000 0.069305007 0.05964825 0.007398862 0.32598
10000 0.046324304 0.04327538 0.016792197 0.09444
ISOT 2000 0.051551610 0.02080945 0.000893305 1.52736
10000 0.019348089 0.01382354 0.000874441 0.41050
attacks as part of their practice and learning, and hence there
is little “normal” TCP traffic in the data. Putting both subsets
together, we have a balanced dataset with both periods with
normal and malicious activities to test our IDS. The TRT
dataset was originally not labelled but textual description
about each day’s activity was provided, and the labelling was
done for this research by a volunteer (Florian Gottwalt) who
was working at TRT while the research was taking place.
Although we are unable to share the raw data of the TRT
dataset, we decided to share the processed intermediate data
(similarity metrics of all settings) at http://www.hooklee.com/
Papers/Data/BenfordsLawIDS/TRT all metrics.7z, which can
work with our source code to reproduce the experimental
results reported in this section.
In addition to the above TRT dataset, to provide some
form of reproducibility for the experimental results reported
in this paper, we also report the experimental results of
applying our IDS to one public dataset: the KDD Cup 1999
dataset [84]. This dataset has attacked connections and nor-
mal connections simulated in a military network environ-
ment. We used 1,870,598 TCP flows in KDD Cup 1999,
which can be downloaded from http://www.hooklee.com/
Papers/Data/BenfordsLawIDS/kddcup data tcp.7z in a (CSV)
format ready to work with our source code. The KDD Cup
1999 dataset has a more recently-improved version, the NLD-
KDD 2009 dataset [87], but we decided to stick with the
original KDD dataset because 1) the NLD-KDD 2009 dataset
was obtained by cleaning and resampling the original KDD
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dataset which destroys the original natural order of TCP flows;
2) the NLD-KDD 2009 dataset contains much less flows thus
does not provide sufficient data for large window size; 3) our
experiments showed NLD-KDD 2009 dataset is indeed not
suitable for our experiments with very unstable results.
B. Dataset Pre-Processing
All the three datasets used have labels at the flow level, but
our IDS works at the flow window level, so we needed to
convert flow labels to flow window labels. The most natural
way of doing the conversion is to introduce a threshold
Tl ∈ {1, · · · ,W} and then label a flow window as malicious
if there are at least Tl malicious flows. More precisely,
assuming a flow window contains W flows whose labels are
{li = 0 or 1}
W
i=1
(1 means malicious and 0 means normal),
then this flow window’s label L can be determined as follows:
L = sign
((
W∑
i=1
li
)
− Tl
)
, (4)
where
sign(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
Note that the threshold Tl can also be represented as a relative
ratio between 0 and 1: tl = Tl/W .
C. Benchmarking Metric
Instead of reporting detection accuracy indicators such as
false positive and false negative rates, we decided to use the
AUC (area under curve) of the ROC (receiver characteristic
curve) of the threshold-based IDS as our main benchmarking
metric. This is because our IDS has tunable parameters so
reporting accuracy figures alone is too simplistic. We were
aware that the ROC is not the best benchmarking tool for IDSs,
but found it more straightforward to use for our proposed IDS
to demonstrate the usefulness of the flow size difference as a
metric for IDS purposes. Advanced benchmarking metrics nor-
mally introduce new factors (e.g. costs [88]) or additional steps
(e.g. adaptive thresholding [89]), which we would like to avoid
as they can unnecessarily over-complicate the performance
evaluation task. Since we expect that the flow size difference as
a metric will be used together with other metrics and methods
to design more complicated IDSs, we leave investigation on
advanced benchmarking metrics as our future work.
D. Experimental Results
We conducted extensive experiments on different parameter
settings of the IDS with the TRT and the KDD Cup 1999
datasets. For each dataset, we consider full combinations of
the following settings: zero handling (counting or skipping
zeros), flow size definition (by byte or packet), relative or
absolute threshold for labelling flow windows (Tl or tl), and
all the seven similarity metrics we listed in Sec IV-F. The TRT
dataset does not actually have any zero flow size difference
and the KDD Cup dataset has only one definition of flow size
(by byte), so these two options are irrelevant. The window
sizes we tested include 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2500 and 5000.
We tested 22 values of the relative threshold tl (0.01, 0.02,
..., 0.09, 0.1, 0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.2, 0.3, ..., 0.9) and 32
values of the absolute threshold Tl (1, 2, ..., 9, 10, 20, 30, ...,
90, 100, 200, ..., 900, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000).
Largely speaking, the IDS worked very well for both
datasets but it worked much better for the KDD Cup 1999
dataset which was expected because the TRT dataset contains
more recent and more sophisticated attacks. For the KDD Cup
1999 dataset, for each setting we found at least one combi-
nation of the window size and the threshold to achieve a 0%
zero rate (i.e., the AUC being 1). Some selected ROC curves
with the corresponding AUC values are shown in Figs. 2 and
3. A complete set of all AUC values with a comparative
summary for all settings can be downloaded at http://www.
hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BenfordsLawIDS/AUCs all.7z (two
Excel files, one dataset each).
All the similarity metrics worked reasonably well. The
χ2 divergence and the modified Kullback-Leiber divergence
performed the best overall cross both datasets and all settings.
For two different variants of the flow size difference (in
byte and in packet) for the TRT dataset, the byte-based
version worked consistently better: for the byte-based version
the maximum AUC value across all settings is 0.949688057,
and for the packet-based version the maximum value is only
0.926641651 (≈ 2.43% smaller).
The TRT dataset does not contain any zero flow size
difference, so the zero handling option is irrelevant. As a
contrast, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset has a large number of
zero flow size differences, so both options of zero handling
were tested. The experimental results revealed that it is more
beneficial to count such zeros rather than skipping them.
The IDS’s performance has dependency on the flow window
size W and the threshold Tl (tl), because W can influence
the temporal resolution and both parameters influence the
definition of a flow window being considered malicious. Note
that the threshold Tl (tl) is not an operational parameter since
it will not influence the output of the IDS, although it is needed
to estimate detection accuracy. The detection threshold of the
IDS is the real operational parameter which need frequently
updating to balance the false negative and false positive rates.
VII. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The results shown in the previous section should be seen
with caution as for both tested datasets the attacks are not
necessary representative in other networking environments.
The ground-truth labels in the TRT dataset were manually
done by a human expert who looked at the network traffic
data without information of what actually happened during
the traffic recording sessions. To some extent we can consider
the TRT dataset’s labels as ratings of a human expert on
suspiciousness of flows, so putting all the results together, we
can argue that the proposed IDS does work in predicting what
a human expert would produce. The fact that the proposed
IDS works on both a public dataset and a more recent and
independent dataset implies that the proposed method is robust
as well. In future we plan to test the proposed IDS on more
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Fig. 2. ROC curves of the IDS tested with the KDD Cup 1999 dataset: (b) χ2 divergence, tl = 0.9; (b) modified Kullback-Leiber divergence, Tl = 1000.
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Fig. 3. ROC curves of the IDS tested with the TRT dataset: (a) χ2 divergence, tl = 0.4; (b) modified Kullback-Leiber divergence, Tl = 70.
datasets to further verify its performance across more real-
world datasets. We also plan to make use of the automatically
labelled (using an ensemble of automated IDSs) MAWILab
dataset [86] to test our work against other automated IDSs on
a more diverse set of network traffic.
The flow size difference as a new IDS metric can obviously
be used to enhance other existing IDSs detecting malicious
network flows. Some possible ways to achieve this include: 1)
adding the flow size difference as a new feature used by the
IDS classifier together with other features; 2) using the flow
size difference based IDS as an early warning system to trigger
other more advanced IDSs to focus on regions of interests in
the network traffic; 3) using the flow size difference based IDS
as a secondary IDS to identify missing attacks; 4) using the
flow size difference based IDS to generate pseudo-labels for
semi-supervised training of a more complicated IDS.
Using the simple form of Benford’s law without any gener-
alization means no parameter estimation is needed. In addition,
the flow size difference based IDS is a simple threshold based
IDS without the need to be trained (which is a common merit
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of all distribution based IDSs). The IDS does have some
adjustable parameters but they can be set intuitively and based
on observed statistics of the similarity metric, which can be
done by a simple software tool processing all historical flows
(both normal and malicious ones). Even when such historical
data is not available, one can still set some initial values and
then incrementally adjust the parameters while normal and
malicious flows are being observed. As a whole, the IDS can
be easily deployed without much burden of “making it ready”.
The two main operational parameters of the flow size
difference based IDS are: the classifier’s decision threshold T ,
the flow window size W . The former can be used to balance
false negative and false positive rates, and the latter to balance
detection accuracy and temporal resolution. Note that W will
influence the false negative and false positive rates as well
(as shown in the previous section) but in an indirect way.
Both parameters have a clear semantic meaning from an IDS
operator’s point of view: 1) T is the deviation from Benford’s
law, as measured by the selected similarity metric; 2) W
simply define how many flows one need to observe before
making a decision. Typical initial values of both parameters
can be set to T = 0.4 and W = 2500 according to our
experiments on the TRT dataset. We believe that W is more
stable so once a preferred value is set it will remain for a long
time without the need to be changed, but T may evolve more
quickly in order to adapt to rapidly evolving attacks.
If an attacker is aware of the use of the flow size difference
based IDS, he will try to adapt his attacking strategies so that
the network traffic generated from attacks can fall below the
alerting threshold. There are at least two possible strategies:
1) adapting the attacks’ network traffic precisely to match the
target distribution (i.e., Benford’s law), which is difficult or
impossible as the attacker normally does not have control
of other users and network devices’ activities; 2) reducing
the level of attack activity so that it hides well in normal
traffic, which effectively leads to a special kind of network-
based information hiding (which will require a completely
different treatment for detection). The second strategy may
make some attacks completely meaningless (harmless) e.g. for
DDoS slowing down the incoming traffic will make the attack
itself fail by definition. For some other attacks, the second
strategy will normally be acceptable (e.g. port scanning or
online password guess) but will significantly increase the costs
of performing the target attacks and the chance of the attacks
being detected by other means (e.g. other IDS methods or
manual inspection). If launching an attack requires too much
time, the target may also become unavailable e.g. if the target
is a moving object or does not have a permanent network
address – a typical example is a mobile device.
We focused at bidirectional TCP flows in this work. Our ini-
tial tests on other types of network flows such as unidirectional
TCP flows showed that Benford’s law may not be applied
directly, which can be explained by the observation that many
unidirectional TCP flows are often highly asymmetric (more
and larger packets from server to client). Possible applications
to other types of flows such as IP, ICMP and UDP flows
require more work as well since such flows are normally
defined as unidirectional and the sessional boundary is not
as clearly defined as in the TCP case.
In our future work we will also investigate if and how our
work can be generalized beyond the simple form of Benford’s
law. For instance, we will look at Benford’s law with a base
different from 10, the generalized Benford’s law [39] and other
natural laws such as Zipf’s law [15], [16] and the Stigler
distribution [37] (in case the simple Benford’s law does not
work in some cases e.g. UDP flows).
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates possible applications of Benford’s
law to anomaly-based network flow IDS and reports a new
metric which has not been studied: flow size difference.
Different from flow size, flow size difference has been rarely
studied in the IDS and networking literature, but our study
showed that it is a very good metric for IDS purposes: normal
TCP flows follow Benford’s law closely but malicious ones
deviate from it significantly. We conducted a large number
of experiments with many network traffic datasets to verify
the observation, and used it to construct a simple threshold-
based IDS. The IDS was tested with two labelled datasets
(one closed dataset and one public dataset) and it has been
shown the performance of the IDS is promising, especially
considering its simple structure. We call for more research on
the use of flow size difference in IDS research, particularly on
how to use it to improve other IDS methods.
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